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ABSTRACT 
Security is critical to repository trustworthiness. Recent 
international standards for Trustworthy Digital Repositories 
(TDRs) all specify some sort of security criteria that are 
necessary to adhere to in order to attain TDR status. However, 
little is known about how those who are responsible for 
addressing these criteria actually regard the concept of security. 
This study centers on digital repository staff members’ 
perceptions of security, including their perceptions of security 
criteria in standards for TDRs. This paper discusses findings 
from surveys and semi-structured interviews with staff from 
repositories that have recently acquired the nestor seal of 
approval. We found that participants considered the principles 
of confidentiality, integrity, and availability as relevant to their 
notions of security. We also found that participants considered 
the security criteria required to acquire the nestor seal of 
approval as both sufficient and appropriate for addressing their 
repositories’ needs. Implications for better understanding the 
security of digital repositories are discussed as well as 
directions for future research.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Unarguably, security is part of what is necessary for a digital 
repository to be trustworthy. Evidence of the importance of 
security can be seen by examining criteria pertaining to security 
in recent standards for Trustworthy Digital Repositories 
(TDRs). For example, these criteria specify that staff identify 
sections of their repositories that are worthy of protection, 
analyze potential threats and perform risk assessment [4, 5, 9]. 
While security criteria in standards for TDRs seem relatively 
straightforward, little is known about actual staff members’ 
perceptions of these security criteria. For example, staff may 
consider the criteria relatively easy to address, or they may 
consider the criteria rather challenging to address. Staff also 
may consider their repositories more secure as a result of 
adhering to these criteria or they may not. Digital repository 
staff members have a direct impact on the security of TDRs. 
They make decisions and implement policies that can result 
either in increased security or compromises to security. For 
these reasons it is critically important to better understand how 
digital repository staff members think about security. 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand digital repository 
staff members’ perceptions of security for TDRs. The 
remainder of this paper is as follows. First, we explore 
scholarship on security in the digital preservation and computer 
science literatures. Second, the methodology section describes 
the sample of participants and explains why they were selected. 
The methodology section also describes data collection and 
analysis techniques. Third, the findings are reported. The paper 
concludes with a discussion and explication of implications of 
the study and recommends directions for future research.   
 
2. SCHOLARSHIP ON SECURITY  
2.1 Security in the Digital Preservation 
Literature 
Security refers to “the practice of defending information from 
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, 
perusal, inspection, recording or destruction” [16, p. 224]. The 
best place to understand the phenomenon of security within the 
field of digital preservation is to examine recent standards for 
TDRs. They represent a consensus among key members of the 
digital preservation community on what constitutes best 
practice. They include specific criteria pertaining to security as 
part of attaining formal “trustworthy” status for digital 
repositories. For example, criterion C34 in DIN 31644 requires 
organizations and their infrastructures to protect their digital 
repositories and their contents [4, 11]. In particular, criterion 
C34 requires staff at organizations to protect the integrity of 
digital repositories and their content. To accomplish this, nestor 
certification against criterion C34 recommends that staff 
identify sections of the archive that are worthy of protection, 
analyze potential threats to the archive, and perform risk 
assessment “of the damage scenarios [to] ultimately result in a 
consistent security system” [11, p. 40]. For example, according 
to the explanatory notes on the nestor seal for TDRs, criterion 
C34 asks staff at organizations to identify which of three types 
of damage scenarios they perceive as a particular threat to 
information preserved by digital repositories: 1) malicious 
actions, 2) human error, or 3) technical failure. The explanatory 
notes also ask staff to consider the likelihood of each damage 
scenario, the seriousness of each scenario as well as what level 
of residual risk is acceptable. Furthermore, they ask staff about 
what measures they are taking to counter these risks as well as 
how they plan to implement their risk analysis and planned 
countermeasures into their security systems. Finally, these notes 
ask staff about their plans to test and further develop their 
security systems.  
 
Similarly to DIN 31644, ISO 16363 includes a section on 
security entitled “Security Risk Management” [9]. This section 
outlines security criteria for TDRs. According to ISO 16363, 
staff seeking “trustworthy” status for their digital repositories 
must maintain “a systematic analysis of security risk factors 
associated with data, systems, personnel, and physical plant” [9, 
p. 76]. A TDR must also: 
• Implement controls to address defined security risks, 
• Have delineated roles, responsibilities, and 
authorizations related to implementing changes 
within the system, and  
• Have suitable written disaster preparedness and 
recovery plans. 
ISO 16363 also describes three additional security concerns 
that could arise during audit. First, the auditor could be a false 
auditor or have malicious intent. Second, confidential 
information could be lost as a result of performing the audit, 
which could compromise the system. Third, damage to the 
repository system could occur while transferring information 
during audit. To guard against these security threats, 
recommendations in ISO 16363 include: 
• Relying on repositories’ identification and 
authorization systems, 
• Relying on the security systems of auditors and 
settling on information transfer agreements between 
repositories and auditors, and 
• Relying on repositories’ security and safety systems. 
 
Both DIN 31644 and ISO 16363’s security requirements draw 
upon an earlier standard for TDRs: Digital Repository Audit 
Method Based on Risk Assessment known as DRAMBORA 
[5]. For example, ISO 16363 recommends that digital 
repository staff members use DRAMBORA as a tool for 
performing risk assessments. Similarly, DIN 31644 
recommends that digital repository staff members use 
DRAMBORA to help identify the sections of the archive which 
are worthy of protection, analyze any potential threats to the 
specific archive, and perform risk assessments of possible 
damage scenarios.  
 
The DRAMBORA methodology consists of six steps. First, 
digital repository staff members should identify their objectives. 
DRAMBORA includes a list of examples of objectives for 
digital repository staff members to choose from. Second, digital 
repository staff members should identify the activities that are 
necessary to achieve their objectives and assets, including 
human resources and technological solutions, that are central to 
achieving repositories’ objectives. Third, digital repository staff 
members should align risks to their activities and assets. This 
step requires digital repository staff members to document the 
specific risks associated with each identified activity and asset. 
Here a single risk may associate with multiple activities, or vice 
versa. Fourth, digital repository staff members should assess, 
avoid, and treat risks by characterizing each risk’s “probability, 
impact, owner, and the mechanisms or proposed mechanisms 
by which it can be avoided or treated” [5, p. 39]. Fifth, digital 
repository staff members should self-audit their repositories to 
determine what threats are most likely to occur and identify 
areas where improvement is required. Sixth, digital repository 
staff members should complete a risk register listing all 
identified risks and the results of their analysis and evaluation. 
Also known as a risk log, it should include information about 
the status of each risk and include details that can aid digital 
repository staff members in tracking and monitoring risks.  
 
Taken together, standards for TDRs underscore the importance 
of security and provide relatively similar recommendations to 
digital repository staff members about how to address security. 
However, the security criteria themselves do nothing to 
illuminate actual digital repository staff members’ perspectives 
on security or their perceptions of the said security criteria.   
2.2 Security in the Computer Science 
Literature 
Relevant to a discussion on security in the digital preservation 
literature is discussion of security in the computer science 
literature. In digital preservation, the primary focus is on the 
security of digital repositories and their content. On the other 
hand, in the field of computer science security is more 
encompassing, including a broad range of computing 
infrastructures, not just digital repositories. Computer science 
also has a longer, more established body of literature on 
security, including definitions and metrics for the concept.  
 
Computer scientists who specialize in security research have 
reached a consensus that computer security consists of at least 
three main principles: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
Confidentiality refers to concealment of information or 
resources, integrity refers to the trustworthiness of data or 
resources, and availability refers to the ability to use the 
information or resource desired [1]. While security researchers 
seem to agree on these three principles of security, others have 
proposed additional security elements. For example, some 
researchers have recommended including the concept of 
accountability, “the security goal that generates the requirement 
for actions of an entity to be traced uniquely to that entity,” in 
defining trustworthiness [17, p. A-1]. As another example, 
OECD guidelines proposed nine security principles: awareness, 
responsibility, response, ethics, democracy, risk assessment, 
security design and implementation, security management, and 
reassessment [12]. Stoneburner, Hayden, and Feringa [17] 
proposed thirty-three principles related to having a security 
foundation, risk, ease of use, increasing resilience, reducing 
vulnerabilities, and designing with the network in mind. Parker 
[13] extended the classic Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability 
(CIA) triad by adding three elements: possession, authenticity, 
and utility. After a thorough review of the literature, 
Cherdantseva and Hilton [3] proposed extending the CIA triad 
to an Information Assurance and Security (IAS) octave 
consisting of: confidentiality, accountability, auditability, 
authenticity/trustworthiness, non-repudiation, and privacy. It is 
important to note that Cherdantseva and Hilton had IAS 
academics and experts evaluate the IAS octave. According to 
Cherdantseva and Hilton, the IAS octave is part of a larger, all 
encompassing reference model of information assurance and 
security. Although alternative models of security exist, all seem 
to incorporate confidentiality, integrity, and availability at their 
core. 
 
In addition to multiple definitions of security, the literature on 
security in computer science also offers some security metrics. 
For example, these metrics can provide assessment of security 
properties, measurement of adherence to secure coding 
standards, monitoring and reporting of security status, and 
gauge the effectiveness of various security controls [7, 10]. 
Although some security metrics exist, researchers acknowledge 
that security is actually quite difficult to measure. Pfleeger and 
Cunningham [14] list nine reasons why security is hard to 
measure: 
• We can’t test all security requirements, 
• Environment, abstraction, and context affect security, 
• Measurement and security interact, 
• No system stands alone, 
• Security is multidimensional, emergent and 
irreducible,  
• The adversary changes the environment, 
• Measurement is both an expectation and an 
organizational objective,  
• We’re overoptimistic, and 
• We perceive gain differently from loss.  
 
Common to both computer security and security for digital 
repositories is threat modeling.  During the threat modeling 
process, assets are identified; threats against the assets are 
enumerated; the likelihood and damage of threats are 
quantified; and mechanisms for mitigating threats are proposed 
[2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 15].  
 
While some components of the threat modeling process are 
qualitative, quantifying the risk of threats enables system 
administrators to rank the order in which threats should be 
addressed.  Within the computer science literature, various 
approaches have been proposed for characterizing and 
quantifying the risk of threats, including calculating risk as the 
product of the damage potential and the likelihood of 
occurrence, Risk = Criticality * Likelihood of Occurrence [8]. 
Dread, an approach proposed by Microsoft, calculates risk 
across several categories, including: Damage potential, 
Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, and 
Discoverability [8].  Using Dread, a threat is rated on a scale 
from 1 to 10 for each category, with the resulting risk being the 
average of all ratings. Butler and Fischbeck [2] propose a 
multiple attribute threat index (TI) for assessing the risk of a 
threat.  TI captures the relative importance of each type of 
threat [2], where TIa = Freqa * (∑j=attributes Wj * Xaj), and Wj is 
the attribute weight and Xaj is the most likely outcome value 
for the threat. 
 
While quantifying risks will enable us to capture an 
organization’s security requirements, Pfleeger [15] advises that 
we should avoid false precision by doing the following: 
• Base the probability distribution of a threat/attack 
occurring on historical data, not just on expert 
judgment; 
• Since "both scientists and lay people may 
underestimate the error and unreliability in small 
samples of data, particularly when the results are 
consistent with preconceived, emotion-based beliefs”, 
we are to be mindful of the size of our experiments 
and the scalability of our results. 
 
While measuring security is difficult, and few security metrics 
of any kind exist, metrics for understanding perceptions of 
security are particularly scant.  
 
Taken together, the literature on security in digital preservation 
and computer science stress the importance of security, while 
also leaving several open research questions. This study focuses 
on four of them: 
 
1. How do digital repository staff members think about 
the security of Trustworthy Digital Repositories? 
2. What are digital repository staff members’ attitudes 
toward security criteria in standards for Trustworthy 
Digital Repositories? 
3. How relevant are security principles that have been 
established in the computer science domain to digital 
repository staff members’ concept of security? 
4. Is it possible to develop a survey that could serve as a 
tool for measuring digital repository staff members’ 
perceptions of security for Trustworthy Digital 
Repositories? 
 
3. METHODS 
To address the research questions, we conducted interviews 
with digital repository staff members at organizations whose 
repositories have attained formal, third-party trustworthy status. 
We also administered surveys to those individuals. The purpose 
of using these data collection methods was to understand how 
the participants thought about security and to assess 
measurement of the concept. While various standards for 
trustworthy digital repositories exist [4, 6, 9], at present, DIN 
31644 is the only standard that: 1) has been formally recognized 
by a standards-granting body, and 2) has organizations whose 
repositories have been formally certified by third parties. Thus, 
we decided to include in our study only digital repository staff 
members whose repositories have recently acquired nestor seals 
of approval, signifying formal, third-party certification by the 
DIN 31644 standard. To date, two organizations have 
successfully acquired nestor seals of approval. During April 
2016, we recruited participants at these institutions via email, 
asking them to participate in our interviews and take our 
survey.  
 
3.1 Interviews 
During semi-structured interviews, participants discussed their 
definitions of security and trustworthiness. They also discussed 
their views on the relationship between the trustworthiness of 
digital repositories and their security. Afterwards, participants 
discussed security criteria in DIN 31644 (e.g., criterion C34), 
including how easy or difficult they thought it was to address 
the criteria, how prepared they felt to address the criteria, how 
they approached addressing the criteria, whether they thought 
the criteria were sufficient, and what, if any, additional criteria 
they would recommend. Participants also discussed the extent 
to which they thought their repositories were more secure as a 
result of adhering to these criteria. Appendix A includes the 
interview protocol. The interviews lasted approximately 30 
minutes and took place on Skype.  
 
All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. 
Afterwards, transcripts were coded using NVivo – a qualitative 
data analysis software tool. Prior to analyzing the transcripts, 
we developed a codebook based primarily on the three main 
dimensions of security established in the computer science 
literature: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
Specifically, two members of the research team coded the 
transcripts looking for any statements participants made that 
corresponded to the concepts of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. We then calculated a table enumerating the 
frequencies with which participants mentioned each concept in 
relation to their perceptions. Finally, we calculated inter-rater 
reliability using Cohen’s kappa, achieving a score of 0.79. 
 
3.2 Surveys  
In developing our survey, we examined the literature on 
security in digital preservation and computer science, including 
research on security metrics. We did not find an existing 
instrument to measure the security perceptions of computing 
infrastructures by those who are responsible for managing and 
securing said infrastructure. Consequently, we derived items for 
our survey from definitions and explanations of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability in Bishop [1], a foundational text on 
computer security.  
 
We asked the same individuals that we interviewed to take our 
survey. The survey consisted of 19 items: 4 pertaining to 
confidentiality, 11 pertaining to integrity, and 4 pertaining to 
availability. The survey included a 5-point, likert-type scale 
ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree” with one 
additional option: “Not applicable.” Appendix B includes the 
survey instrument. The items were randomized to mitigate 
order effects. 
 
To analyze the survey data, we calculated descriptive statistics, 
including participants’ mean scores on the items that pertained 
to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. We also performed 
the Kruskal-Wallis H test to identify whether there were any 
statistically significant differences in participants’ attitudes 
toward the confidentiality, integrity, and availability principles.  
 
4. FINDINGS  
The findings are organized based on the methods we used to 
collect the data. After discussing participant characteristics, we 
discuss findings from the interviews. Next, we discuss findings 
from the surveys.  
 
4.1 Participant Characteristics 
Two people participated in this study, one from each 
organization that successfully acquired the nestor seal of 
approval. Both participants held senior positions in the 
organizations where they worked. Their responsibilities 
included overseeing teams involved in national and 
international digital preservation projects and initiatives as well 
as policy and services development within their organizations. 
Participants reported working approximately five to nine years 
on digital repositories at their current organizations. Both 
participants reported having involvement in the development of 
standards for digital repositories. 
 
4.2 Interview Findings 
Participants shared their views on the concept of security for 
digital repositories. Specifically, they viewed security as a 
prerequisite for trustworthiness. They saw security as making 
sure that repositories act as they are supposed to with no 
intended or unintended interruptions.  
 
Participants also shared their views on criterion C34 and its 
explanatory notes. They thought that criterion C34 itself was a 
bit general, but the explanatory notes for C34 were a helpful 
complement, providing guidance on how to successfully 
address the criterion within their repositories. Despite the fact 
that participants found it difficult to address criterion C34, they 
felt prepared to address it based on the security measures they 
had in place prior to audit (e.g., redundant storage, protection 
against data manipulation, and implementation of national IT 
standards). While participants did not consider their repositories 
more or less secure as a result of addressing the explanatory 
notes for criterion C34, they thought their documentation for 
what they do to secure systems improved. When asked whether 
the explanatory notes for criterion C34 set the bar for security 
too high, too low, or just right, participants stated that 
addressing the explanatory notes sets the bar just right, 
suggesting that they considered the security requirements for 
nestor certification as reasonable, appropriate, and sufficient for 
securing their repositories.  
 
Analysis of interview data against the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability security principles established in computer 
science revealed that participants provided statements 
pertaining to the concept of integrity most frequently, followed 
by availability and confidentiality. Table 1 lists the frequency 
with which participants provided statements pertaining to each 
concept. When participants mentioned integrity, they referred to 
protecting their data from any threats, including manipulation. 
Participants mentioned the importance of confidentiality and 
availability because both are included in the nestor definition of 
security—a definition which they reported as being important to 
their work. They did not, however, elaborate on what either of 
the concepts meant to them in their practice.  
 
Table 1. Frequency Participants Mentioned Security 
Concepts 
Security Concepts Frequency 
Confidentiality  2 
Integrity 10 
Availability 2 
  
4.3 Survey Findings 
To complement the interview data and get a better sense of the 
relevance of security principles to the participants, we 
administered surveys to them. The surveys asked questions 
about participants’ views on aspects of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability. 
 
Table 2 lists the mean scores of participants’ responses for the 
questions pertaining to each security principle. Comparing the 
mean scores of participants’ responses to the survey questions 
reveals that participants are most concerned with integrity, 
followed by availability and confidentiality.  
 
Table 2. Mean Scores for Security Concepts 
Security Concepts Mean Scores 
Confidentiality  3.38 
Integrity 4.55 
Availability 3.75 
 
A Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that there was a statistically 
significant difference in participants’ ratings of security survey 
items based on the different principles the items referred to, 
Χ2(2) = 7.82, p =  .02, with a mean rank security score of 13.75 
for confidentiality, 23.50 for integrity, and 14.25 for 
availability. These results suggest that participants had stronger 
attitudes about integrity relative to their attitudes about 
availability and confidentiality.   
 
5. DISCUSSION 
Results underscore the importance of security to the digital 
repository staff members who participated in this study. 
Participants mentioned the three security principles of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability during the interviews. 
Participants also rated survey items pertaining to those three 
principles highly, suggesting that they are relevant to their 
views on securing digital repositories.  
 
Although participants mentioned the three security principles of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability during the interviews, 
and rated survey items pertaining to them highly, results of this 
study provide more empirical support for some principles of 
security than others. For example, participants provided more 
statements related to integrity than availability and 
confidentiality. As another example, participants rated survey 
items pertaining to integrity higher than survey items pertaining 
to availability and confidentiality. The fact that the interview 
data and survey data triangulate with respect to more emphasis 
on integrity relative to availability and confidentiality is 
interesting and needs to be looked at more in depth in future 
research. The main questions that we need to understand going 
forward are: Why is integrity more salient to digital repository 
staff members? And what might this mean for research and 
practice? First, we need to understand whether having more 
questions pertaining to the concept of integrity has an effect on 
the results.  Second, we need to understand whether we would 
still receive more empirical support for integrity than 
availability or confidentiality if a similar study was conducted 
with a larger sample of participants. This would enable us to 
know if the study participants’ views on security generalize to 
other digital repository staff members. Third, we need to 
understand what impact digital repository staff members’ views 
on security actually have on the security of digital repositories. 
For example, if the principle of integrity is more salient in 
digital repository staff members’ minds, does this mean that 
digital repositories are less secure when it comes to availability 
and confidentiality? In other words, are digital repository staff 
members focusing on integrity at the expense of availability or 
confidentiality? This may not be the case. It could simply be 
that integrity is more important than availability or 
confidentiality. Or it could be that performing actions related to 
integrity indirectly address issues relating to availability and 
confidentiality. Or it could be that digital repository managers 
find it easier to address availability and confidentiality relative 
to integrity, and so they focus on integrity. At any rate, future 
research should seek to address these issues so that we can have 
a better understanding of how what digital repository staff 
members think about security affects the security of digital 
repositories.  
 
This study makes two primary contributions to the digital 
preservation literature. First, it complements the development 
of standards for TDRs by focusing on the security criteria 
within one of those standards – DIN 31644. This study 
examines these security criteria from digital repository staff 
members’ points of view. Prior to this study, we only had the 
security criteria without insight into the perspectives of those 
who are responsible for actually addressing those criteria. 
Second, this study also contributes to the digital preservation 
literature by providing both qualitative and quantitative data 
collection instruments which can be used to understand digital 
repository staff members’ perceptions on security. Since efforts 
to certify trustworthy digital repositories are well underway, 
and security is a critical element of becoming certified, we 
anticipate that better understanding digital repository staff 
members’ perspectives on security will only increase in 
importance going forward.  
 
This study also makes one main contribution to the computer 
science literature pertaining to security. It takes a classic 
definition of security, one underpinned by the principles of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and moves that 
definition forward by operationalizing the concept with 
measurement items in a survey instrument. This instrument, 
what we call the Security Perception Survey (SPS), represents a 
security metric focused on the perceptions of those responsible 
for managing and securing computing infrastructures. While 
SPS was developed using the responses of people who manage 
and secure TDRs, one specific type of computing infrastructure, 
subsequent studies could assess the generalizability of SPS to 
provide insights into the perceptions of people who are 
responsible for managing and securing other types of 
computing infrastructures.   
 
The primary limitation of this study is its sample size. Only two 
digital repository staff members participated in this study. Thus, 
we cannot generalize the results of this study beyond our 
sample. However, we felt that who participated in this study 
was more important than how many. We needed individuals 
who were at organizations where third parties had verified the 
success of their security efforts. We felt these individuals would 
provide the most insightful information about their views on 
security. We also thought that staff at organizations that 
successfully passed repository certification by the DIN 31644 
standard would be in the best position to evaluate the security 
criteria within the standard. These issues guided our choices 
regarding who was eligible to participate in our study, which in 
turn, led to a small sample size. Despite our small sample size, 
we reached 100% of our sampling frame; representatives from 
all of the organizations that have acquired nestor seals of 
approval participated in this study. It is also important to note 
the challenges to employing traditional research methods, such 
as interviews and surveys, to study security. For example, 
people are reluctant to participate in security studies because: 1) 
they have concerns about whether the information they provide 
could somehow be used by others to compromise their systems, 
or 2) they fear their own shortcomings with respect to their 
expertise might become exposed as a result of participation 
[18]. Although we faced a number of these well-documented 
challenges to recruiting participants for our study, we were yet 
able to successfully recruit individuals from both organizations 
that recently acquired nestor seals of approval.      
 
6. CONCLUSION  
Security is a major issue for digital repositories. Digital 
repository staff members are responsible for managing and 
securing digital repositories, thus their perspectives on security 
are critically important to understand. This study provided a 
preliminary investigation into digital repository staff members’ 
views on security and security criteria in standards for TDRs, in 
particular DIN 31644 and the nestor explanatory notes for 
Trustworthy Digital Archives. Participants articulated their 
views on security in terms of integrity and to a lesser extent 
availability and confidentiality. Results of this study warrant a 
closer correspondence between research on security in digital 
preservation and computer science, because of the overlap that 
results of this study have demonstrated. Participants in this 
study found the security criteria in the standard that they chose 
sufficient. Going forward, researchers should continue 
analyzing digital repository staff members’ views on security 
and security criteria, so that the digital preservation community 
can validate the relevance and importance of the security 
criteria by those who are responsible for making digital 
repositories secure.  
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8. APPENDICES  
 
8.1 Appendix A – Interview Protocol  
 
1. How do you define repository trustworthiness? In 
other words, what does it mean to you for a repository 
to be trustworthy? 
2. How do you define security as it relates to digital 
repositories? In other words, what does security mean 
to you? 
3. How would you describe the relationship between the 
trustworthiness of a digital repository and the security 
of that digital repository? In other words, how would 
you describe the relationship between security and 
trustworthiness? 
4. Take a minute to read over C34, the nestor criterion 
on security. Now think back to when you were 
preparing for audit. How easy or difficult was it to 
address criterion C34 for your digital repository?  
5. How much time do you think it took you and your 
colleagues to address criterion C34? 
6. How prepared were you and your colleagues to 
address criterion C34? 
7. Do you think your repository is more secure as a 
result of addressing criterion C34? Why or why not? 
8. Do you think criterion C34 sets the bar too high for 
addressing security issues? Or do you think criterion 
C34 sets the bar too low for addressing security 
issues? Or do you think criterion C34 sets the bar 
“just right” for addressing security issues? Why or 
why not? 
9. Do you think any additional criteria should be added 
to criterion C34 to make digital repositories more 
secure and therefore more trustworthy? If so, how 
would you describe what criteria should be added? 
10. Did you use DRAMBORA to help you address the 
security criteria in DIN 31644? If so, which parts of 
DRAMBORA were most helpful and why? 
11. Is there anything else you’d like to add, given our 
topic of security of Trustworthy Digital Repositories? 
 
8.2 Appendix B – Security Perceptions 
Survey  
 
Questions pertaining to confidentiality (Questions were 
answered on a 5-point, likert-type scale ranging from “Strongly 
disagree” to “Strongly agree” with one additional option: “Not 
applicable.”) 
 
1. Access control mechanisms should be used to support 
confidentiality (e.g., cryptography). 
2. Mechanisms should be used to prevent illicit access to 
information. 
3. The existence of data should be denied to protect it. 
4. Resources should be hidden to protect them. 
 
Questions pertaining to integrity (Questions were answered on a 
5-point, likert-type scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to 
“Strongly agree” with one additional option: “Not applicable.”) 
 
1. Improper changes to data should be prevented. 
2. Unauthorized changes to data should be prevented. 
3. Information about the source of data should be 
protected. 
4. Unauthorized changes to information about the source 
of data should be prevented. 
5. Prevention mechanisms should be used to maintain 
the integrity of data by blocking any unauthorized 
attempts to change the data. 
6. Prevention mechanisms should be used to maintain 
the integrity of data by blocking any attempts to 
change the data in unauthorized ways. 
7. Detection mechanisms should be used to report when 
the data's integrity is no longer trustworthy. 
8. System events (e.g., user or system actions) should be 
analyzed to detect problems. 
9. The data itself should be analyzed to see if it has been 
changed. 
10. A system should report what causes integrity 
violations. 
11. A system should report when a file is corrupt. 
 
Questions pertaining to availability (Questions were answered 
on a 5-point, likert-type scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” 
to “Strongly agree” with one additional option: “Not 
applicable.”) 
 
1. A system should guard against denial of data attacks. 
2. A system should guard against denial of service 
attacks. 
3. An unavailable system is at least as bad as no system 
at all. 
4. A system administrator should be able to tell the 
difference between when data is not available due to 
circumstances in the environment versus a security 
attack. 
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